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ABSTRACT
Moving target defense has emerged as a critical paradigm of pro-
tecting a vulnerable system against persistent and stealthy attacks.
To protect a system, a defender proactively changes the system
configurations to limit the exposure of security vulnerabilities to
potential attackers. In doing so, the defender creates asymmetric un-
certainty and complexity for the attackers, making it much harder
for them to compromise the system. In practice, the defender incurs
a switching cost for each migration of the system configurations.
The switching cost usually depends on both the current configu-
ration and the following configuration. Besides, different system
configurations typically require a different amount of time for an
attacker to exploit and attack. Therefore, a defender must simultane-
ously decide both the optimal sequences of system configurations
and the optimal timing for switching. In this paper, we propose
a Markov Stackelberg Game framework to precisely characterize
the defender’s spatial and temporal decision-making in the face of
advanced attackers. We introduce a relative value iteration algo-
rithm that computes the defender’s optimal moving target defense
strategies. Empirical evaluation on real-world problems demon-
strates the advantages of the Markov Stackelberg game model for
spatial-temporal moving target defense.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Moving target defense (MTD) has established itself as a power-
ful framework to counter persistent and stealthy threats that are
frequently observed in Web applications [31, 33], cloud-based ser-
vices [11, 23], database systems [40], and operating systems [8]. The
core idea of MTD is that a defender proactively switches configura-
tions (a.k.a., attack surfaces) of a vulnerable system to increase the
uncertainty and complexity for potential attackers and limits the
resources (e.g., window of vulnerabilities) available to them [9]. In
contrast to MTD techniques, traditional passive defenses typically
use analysis tools to identify vulnerabilities and detect attacks.
A major factor for a defender to adopt MTD techniques rather
than passive defensive applications is that adaptive and sophisti-
cated attackers often have asymmetric advantages of resources (e.g.,
time, prior knowledge of the vulnerabilities) over the defender due
to the static nature of system configurations [20, 30]. For instance,
clever attackers are likely to exploit the system over time and subse-
quently identify the optimal targets to compromise without being
detected by the static defensive applications [39]. In such case, a
well-crafted MTD technique is more effective because it changes
the static nature of the system and increases the attackers’ com-
plexity and cost of mounting successful attacks [6]. In this way, it
reduces or even eliminates the attackers’ asymmetric advantages
of the resources.
Despite the promising prospects of MTD techniques, it is chal-
lenging to implement optimal MTD strategies. Two factors con-
tribute to the difficult situation. On one hand, the defender must
make the switching strategies sufficiently unpredictable because
otherwise the attacker can thwart the defense. On the other hand,
the defender should not conduct too frequent system migrations
because each migration incurs a switching cost that depends on
both the current configuration and the following configuration.
Thus, the defender must make a careful tradeoff between the effec-
tiveness and the cost efficiency of the MTD techniques. The tradeoff
requires the defender to simultaneously decide both the optimal
sequences of system configurations (i.e., the next configuration
to be switched to) and the optimal timing for switching. To this
end, an MTD model must precisely characterizes the defender’s
spatial-temporal decision-making.
A natural approach to model the strategic interactions between
the defender and the attacker is to use game-theoretic models such
as the zero-sum dynamic game [37] and the Stackelberg Security
game (SSG) model [26, 28, 32]. The dynamic game model is general
enough to capture different transition methods of the system states
and various information structures but optimal solutions to the
game are often difficult to compute. This model also assumes that
the switching cost from one configuration to another is fixed [37].
In the SSG model, the defender commits to a mixed strategy that
is independent of the state transitions of the system [28, 32]. The
attacker adopts a best-response strategy to the defender’s mixed
strategy. While optimal solutions to an SSG can be obtained effi-
ciently, the SSG models neglect the fact that both the defender’s
and the attacker’s strategy can be contingent on the states of the
system configurations. To address this problem, Feng et al. incorpo-
rate both Markov decision process and Stackelberg game into the
modeling of the MTD game [7].
Many MTD models [5, 10, 26, 28] do not explicitly introduce
the concept of the defending period, although they usually assume
that the defender chooses to execute a migration after a constant
time period [27]. A primary reason is that when both time and the
system’s state influence the defender’s decision making, optimal
solutions to the defender’s MTD problem are non-trivial [16, 27].
Recently, Li and Zheng has proposed to incorporate timing into
the defender’s decision making processes [15]. Their work assumes
that there is a positive transition probability between any two
configurations (so that the corresponding Markov decision process
is unichain), whichmay lead to sub-optimalMTD strategies. Further,
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their model assumes that all the attackers have the same type, which
might not be true in reality. To solve the defender’s optimal MTD
problem in more general settings, an MTD model that precisely
models the strategic interactions between the defender and the
attacker is in urgent need.
Our contributions. In this paper, we propose a general frame-
work called the Markov Stackelberg Game (MSG) model for spatial-
temporal moving target defense. The MSG model enables the de-
fender to implement optimal defense strategy that is contingent
on both the source states and the destination states of the system.
It also allows the defender to simultaneously decide which state
the system should be migrated to and when it should be migrated.
In the MSG model, we formulate the defender’s optimization prob-
lem as an average-cost semi-Markov decision process (SMDP) [24]
problem. We present a value iteration algorithm that can solve
the average-cost SMDP problem efficiently after transforming the
original average-cost SMDP problem into a discrete time Markov
decision process (DTMDP) problem. We empirically evaluate our
algorithm using real-world data obtained from the National Vul-
nerability Database (NVD) [21]. Experimental results demonstrate
the advantages of using MSG over the state-of-the-art approaches
in MTD.
2 RELATEDWORK
Our MSG model is built on an important game-theoretic model
called Stackelberg games [34] that has broad applications in many
fields, including spectrum allocation [36], smart grid [35] and se-
curity [29]. In a Stackelberg game, there are two players: a leader
and a follower. The leader acts first by committing to a strategy.
The follower observes the leader’s strategy and then maximizes
his reward based on his observation [1]. Each player in a Stackel-
berg game has a set of possible pure strategies (i.e., actions) that
can be executed. A player can also play a mixed strategy that is a
distribution over the pure strategies.
Stackelberg games have been extensively used to model the
strategic interactions between a defender and an attacker in security
domains [29]. This category of Stackelberg games is often called
Stackelberg security games (SSGs). In SSGs, a defender aims to defend
a set of targets using a limited number of resources. An attacker
learns the defender’s strategy and mounts attacks to maximize his
benefits. The pure strategy for a defender is an allocation of the
defender’s limited resources to the targets, while a mixed strategy
is a probability distribution over all the possible allocations. The
defender’s optimization problem in an SSG is to compute a mixed
strategy that maximizes her expected utility (i.e., minimizes her
expected losses) given that the attacker learns the defender’s mixed
strategy and performs a best response to the defender’s action.
Whenever there is a tie, the attacker always breaks the tie in favor
of the defender [19]. This solution concept is called the strong
Stacklberg equilibrium [4]. In our paper, we consider the strong
Stacklberg equilibrium as the solution concept for the MSG game.
3 MODEL
In this section, we describe the Markov Stackelberg Game (MSG)
model for moving target defense where a defender and an attacker
compete for taking control of the system. Specifically, we first
introduce key notations used to model the system configuration,
the defender and the attacker. We then present both the attacker’s
and the defender’s optimization problems in the spatial-temporal
moving target defense game. Finally, we compare our MSG model
with the Stackelberg Security Game model [22, 29] that has been
extensive studied in security research.
3.1 System Configuration
In moving target defense, a defender proactively shifts variables
of a computing system to increase uncertainty for the attacker to
mount successful attacks. The variables of the system are often
called adaptive aspects [38, 39]. Typical adaptable aspects include
IP address, port number, network protocol, operating system, pro-
gramming language, machine replacement, and memory to cache
mapping [38]. A computing system usually have multiple adapt-
able aspects. Let D ∈ N denote the number of adaptive aspects for
the computing system and Φi the set of sub configurations in the
ith adaptive aspect. If the defender selects the sub configuration
ϕi ∈ Φi for the ith adaptive aspect, then the configuration state of
the system is denoted as s = (ϕ1,ϕ2, . . . ,ϕD ). Here, s is a generic
element of the set of system configurations S = Φ1 ×Φ2 × · · · ×ΦD .
Let n = |S | denote the number of system configurations in S .
Example 3.1. Consider a mobile app with two adaptive aspects:
the programming language aspectΦ1 = {Python, Java, JavaScript}
and the operating system aspect Φ2 = {iOS,Android}. If the de-
fender selects Java for the programming language aspect and iOS
for the operating system aspect, then the composite system con-
figuration is s = (ϕ1,ϕ2) = (Java, iOS). The maximum number
of valid configurations for the app is 6. However, it is likely that
only a subset of the configuration set is valid due to both physical
constraints and performance requirement of the system.
3.2 The Attacker
We consider a stealthy and persistent attacker that constantly ex-
ploits vulnerabilities of the system configurations to gain benefits.
3.2.1 Attacker Type. A successful attack requires a competent
attacker that has the expertise to exploit the vulnerabilities. For
instance, to gain control of a remote computer, the attacker needs
the capability to obtain the control of at least one of the following
resources: the IP address of the computer, the port number of a
specific application running on the machine, the operating system
type, the vulnerabilities of the application, or the root privilege
of the computer [38]. The attacker’s ability profile is called the
attacker type. There are different attacker types. Let L denote the
set of attacker type. Each attacker type l ∈ L is capable of mounting
a set of attacks Al . The attacker type space Al is a nonempty set
of the attack methods that each targets one vulnerability in one
adaption aspect, which may affect multiple sub configurations in
that aspect. Multiple attacks may target the same vulnerability but
may have different benefit (loss) to the attacker (defender) as defined
below. Whether an attack method belongs to an attacker type space
or not depends on the application scenarios. Figure 1 illustrates the
relationship between attacker types, attack methods, adaptation
aspects, sub-configuration parameters and system configurations.
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Figure 1: An illustration of the relationship between at-
tacker types, attack methods, adaptation aspects, sub-
configuration parameters, and system configurations.
3.2.2 Attacking Time. If an attacker with the attacker type l
chooses an attack method a ∈ Al to attack the system in state
j, then the time needed for him to compromise the system is a
random variable ξa, j that is drawn from a given distribution Ξa, j .
If a is not targeting a vulnerability of any sub configuration in
state j, ξa, j = +∞. The attacker only gains benefits when he has
successfully compromised the system. A system is considered to be
compromised as long as the attacker compromises one of the sub
configurations. In this work, L, {Al }, and {Ξa, j } are assumed to be
common knowledge.
3.3 The Defender
We consider a defender that proactively switches among different
system configurations to increase the attacker’s cost of mounting
successful attacks. In practice, each migration incurs a cost to the
defender. Frequent migrations often bring high cost while infre-
quent migrations make the system vulnerable to potential attacks.
To make MTD feasible for deployment, the defender must also find
the optimal time period to defend. An optimal MTD solution for the
defender is to compute a strategy that simultaneously determines
where to migrate and when to migrate.
3.3.1 Migration Cost. During the migration process, the de-
fender updates the system to retake maintain the control of the
system and pay some updating cost, then selects and shifts the
system from the current configuration state i ∈ S to the next valid
system configuration state j ∈ S with a costmi j . We can consider
that the migration is implemented instantaneously. This is without
loss of generality because one can always assume that during the
migration the system is still at state i . If the defender decides to
stay at the current state i , then the cost ismii . Since there is a cost
for updating the system, it requires thatmii > 0 for all i, j ∈ S . Let
M be the matrix of the migration cost between any states i, j ∈ S ,
we haveM = [mi j ]n×n . It is crucial to note that the migration cost
mi j may depend on both the source configuration state i and the
destination configuration state j.
3.3.2 Defending Period. The defender not only needs to deter-
mine which configuration state to use but also should decide when
to move. If the defender stays in a configuration state sufficiently
long, the attacker is likely to compromise the system even if the
defender shifts eventually. Thus, the defender needs to pick the
defending period judiciously. Let tk denote the time instance that
the kth migration happens, the kth defending period is calculated
by tk −tk−1. Intuitively, a defending period τ should be greater than
zero, since the system needs some time to prepare the system mi-
gration or the updating. The defending period cannot be infinitely
large because the system must switch the configurations periodi-
cally. Otherwise, it loses the benefits of moving target defense as
the system will be compromised eventually and stay compromised
after that. Therefore, it is natural to require that the defending
period length τ has a lower bound τ ∈ R>0 and an upper bound
τ ∈ R>0. That is, τ ∈ [τ ,τ ]. Note that the unit time cannot be
infinitely small in practice. This allows us to discretize time for
analytic convenience.
3.3.3 Defender’s Strategy. In our model, the defender adopts a
stationary strategy u that simultaneously decides where to move
(depending on both the current state at k-th period and the next
state at (k + 1)-th period) and when to move (depending on the
current state at k-th period). Let pi j denote the probability that the
defender moves from state i to state j , then the transition probabili-
ties between any two states in S can be represented by a transition
matrix P = [pi j ]n×n , where ∑j ∈S pi j = 1. When the system config-
uration state is i , the defender uses a mixed strategy pi = (pi j )j ∈S
to determine the next state to switch to.
In contrast, the defender needs to determine the next defend-
ing period τi ∈ [τ ,τ ] when she moves the system from current
state i to the next state. The defending period matrix is thus τ =
[τ1,τ2, . . . ,τn ] where i ∈ S . In our model, we assume that the next
(k + 1)-th defending period only depends on the current system
state i at k-th period. There are two considerations: first, the transi-
tion probabilities pi have already captured the differences between
different destination states; second, it allows the defender’s prob-
lem to be modeled as a semi-Markov decision process (defined in
Section 3.4.3). The defender’s stationary strategy is denoted by
u = (P ,τ ) = [u(i)]i ∈S where u(i) = (pi ,τi ) is the defender’s action
when the system’s current configuration state is i . See Figure 2 for
an illustration of the system model. Note that the subscript i in τi
means the period length depends on state i at k-th period. The time
period τi is indifferent to the next state j at (k + 1)-th period for
any j ∈ S .
3.4 Markov Stackelberg Game
In our paper, we model moving target defense as a Markov Stackel-
berg game (MSG) where the defender is the leader and the attacker
is the follower. At the beginning the defender commits to a station-
ary strategy that is announced to the attacker. The attacker’s goal
is to maximize his expected reward by constantly attacking the
system’s vulnerabilities. The defender’s objective is to minimize
the total loss due to attacks plus the total migration cost.
TheMSGmodel is an extension of the Stackelberg Security Game
(SSG) model that has been widely adopted in security domains [29].
A key advantage of using the Stackelberg game model is that it en-
ables the defender acting first to commit to a mixed strategy while
the attacker selects his best response after observing the defender’s
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Figure 2: An illustration of the Markov Stackelberg game
model. The first defending period (between t0 and t1) de-
pends on the initial state (assuming State 2 is the initial con-
figuration state). A light green block represents the time pe-
riod when the system is protected while a dark red block
denotes the time period when the system is compromised.
Herepi j is the probability that the defendermoves from con-
figuration state i to j, and τi is the length of the current de-
fending period when the previous configuration is i.
strategy [14]. This advantage allows the defender to implement de-
fense strategies prior to potential attacks [15]. In MTD, the defender
proactively switches the system between different configurations
to increase the attacker’s uncertainty. It is thus natural to model
the defender as the leader and the attacker as the follower.
3.4.1 Information Structure. In ourmodel, we consider a stealthy
and persistent attacker that learns the defender’s stationary strat-
egy u. Note that even if the defender’s strategy is not announced
initially, the attacker will learn the system states (e.g., through
probing) and the defender’s strategy eventually due to the stealthy
and persistent nature of the attacks. Thus, it is without loss of
generality to assume that the defender announces her stationary
strategy to the attacker before the game starts. We further assume
that the attacker always learns the previous state of the (k − 1)-th
period at the beginning of the k-th period no matter the attack is
successful or not in the previous (k − 1)-th period. Hence, at the
beginning of each stage, the only uncertainty to the attacker is the
current configuration state (it knows the previous state and from
that, it also knows when the current defending period will end as
the length of which is determined by the previous state). Note that
is a worse-case scenario from the defender’s perspective.
In many security domains, it is often difficult for the defender to
obtain real-time feedback about whether the system is compromised
or not because the attacker is likely to be stealthy. The defender,
however, may have some prior knowledge about the attacker type
distribution [22, 28]. Thus, we assume that the defender has a prior
belief π = {πl } on the probability distribution of the attacker type
l .
3.4.2 Attacker’s Optimization Problem. The attacker chooses an
attack method at the beginning of each stage to maximize its long-
term reward. In our model, the defender adopts a stationary strategy
that is known to the attacker. Thus, the long-run optimality can be
achieved if the attacker always follows a best response in each stage.
Hence, we consider a myopic attacker that aims to maximize his
benefits by always using a best response to the defender’s strategy
according to its knowledge on the previous system configuration
state.
Consider an arbitrary stage and assume that the previous config-
uration state at the (k−1)-th period is i and the current configuration
state at the k-th period is j. For an attack a to be successful in this
stage, the time ξa, j required for the attacker when using attack
method a targeting state j should be less than the length of the de-
fending period τi . Let Rla, j denote the attacker’s benefit per unit of
time when the system is compromised, which is jointly determined
by the attacker’s type l , its chosen attack method a, and the state j .
The reward that the attacker receives is then (τi − ξa, j )+Rla, j where
(x)+ ≜ max(0,x).
The optimization problem for the attacker with type l is to max-
imize his expected reward per defending period by choosing an
attack method a from his attack space Al :
max
a∈Al
∑
j ∈S
pi jE[(τi − ξa, j )+]Rla, j (1)
where τi and {pi j } are the defending period length and the transi-
tion probabilities given by the defender under state i , respectively.
3.4.3 Defender’s Optimization Problem. We consider a defender
that constantly migrates among the system configurations in order
to minimize the total loss due to attacks plus the total migration
cost. We use an average cost semi-Markov decision process (SMDP)
to model the defender’s optimization problem. The SMDP model
considers a defender that aims to minimize her long-term defense
cost in an infinite time horizon using spatial-temporal decision
making.
Let Cla, j denote the unit time loss for the defender under state
j due to an attack a launched by a type l attacker. The defender’s
action at state i is u(i) = (pi ,τi ) and her expected single period cost
is:
c(i,u(i)) =
∑
l ∈L
πl
©­«
∑
j ∈S
pi jE[(τi − ξal , j )+]Clal , j
ª®¬ +
∑
j ∈S
pi jmi j
s .t . al = arg max
a∈Al
©­«
∑
j ∈S
pi jE[(τi − ξa, j )+]Rla, j
ª®¬ , ∀l ∈ L (2)
where the first part in the objective function is the expected attack-
ing loss and the second part is the expected migration cost.
The game starts at t0 = 0 and let s0 be the initial state that is
randomly selected from the state space S . The defender adopts a
stationary policyu whereu(sk ) = (psk ,τsk ) for each state sk , which
generates an expected cost c(sk ,u(sk )) that includes potential loss
from compromises and migrations. Given the initial state s0, the
defender’s long-term average cost is defined as:
z(s0,u(s0)) = lim inf
N→∞
∑N−1
k=0 c(sk ,u(sk ))∑N−1
k=0 τsk
(3)
The goal of the defender is to commit to a stationary policy
u∗ = [u∗(i)]n that minimizes the time-average cost for any initial
state. z(i,u∗(i)) = infu z(i,u(i)), ∀i ∈ S For each u(i) = (pi ,τi ), we
have pi j ∈ [0, 1] for all j, ∑j pi j = 1, and τi ∈ [τ ,τ ]. Thus, the
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action spaceU (i) for every u(i) is [0, 1]n × [τ ,τ ], which is a contin-
uous space. We assume that c(i,u(i)) is continuous overU (i). The
defender’s optimization problem corresponds to finding a strong
Stackelberg equilibrium [4] where the defender commits to an
optimal strategy assuming that the attacker will choose the best
response to the defender’s strategy and break ties in favor of the
defender. This is a common assumption in Stackelberg security
game literature.
3.4.4 Challenges of Computing Optimal MTD Strategies. The are
two main challenges for the defender to compute the optimal strate-
gies. First, when an arbitrary transition matrix P is allowed, the
Markov chain associated with the given P may have a complicated
chain structure. The optimal solution may not exist and standard
methods such as Value Iteration (VI) and Policy Iteration (PI) [24]
may never converge when applied to an average-cost SMDP with
a continuous action space. Second, a bilevel optimization problem
needs to be solved in each iteration of VI or PI, which is challenging
due to the infinite action space and the coupling of spatial and
temporal decisions.
3.5 MSG versus SSG
Our Markov Stackelberg game model extends the classic Stackel-
berg Security Game (SSG) [22] in important ways. In the classic
SSG model, there is a set of targets and a defender has a limited
amount of resources to protect them. The defender serves as the
leader and commits to a mixed strategy. The attacker observes the
defender’s strategy (but not her action) and then responds accord-
ingly. Thus, the SSG model is essentially a one-shot game. The
SSG model has been extended to Bayesian Stackelberg Game (BSG)
model to capture multiple attack types where the defender knows
the distribution of attack types a prior as we assumed. In a recent
work [29], the BSG model has been used to model moving target de-
fense where only the spatial decision is considered and the defender
commits to a vector [pj ]n where pj is the probability of moving to
configuration state j in the next stage, which is independent of the
current configuration state.
We note that the BSG model in [29] is a special case of our MSG
model. Specifically, let τi = 1 for all i ∈ S and ξ lal , j = 0 for all
al ∈ Al , j ∈ S . We further assume that pi j = pj for all j ∈ S .
Then the SMDP becomes an MDP with state independent transition
probabilities. Since each row of the transitionmatrix is the same, the
stationary distribution of the corresponding Markov chain is just
[pj ]n . Therefore, the average-cost SMDP reduces to the following
one-stage optimization problem to the defender:
min
p
∑
l
πl
(∑
j
pjC
l
al , j
)
+
∑
i, j
pipjmi j
s .t . al = arg max
a∈Al
(∑
j
pjR
l
a, j
)
∀l ∈ L (4)
This is exactly the BSG model for MTD in [29]. In the BSG variant,
the transition probabilities depend on only the destination state.
It corresponds to a special case in our model when the transition
probabilities in each row are the same. This simplifiedMTD strategy
is optimal only if the migration cost depends on the destination
state only but not the source state.
Our MSG model enables the defender to handle the complex
scenarios when the migration cost is both source and destination
dependent. It also takes the defending period into account when
in computing the optimal defense strategy. This consideration is
useful because a stealthy and persistent attacker will compromise
the system eventually if the system stays in a state longer than the
corresponding attacking time.
4 OPTIMAL MOVING TARGET DEFENSE
This section presents an efficient solution to the defender’s opti-
mization problem in spatial-temporal moving target defense. We
first show that the original average-cost SMDP problem can be
transformed into a discrete time Markov decision process (DTMDP)
problem using a data transformation method. We then introduce a
value iteration algorithm to solve the DTMDP problem and prove
that the algorithm converges to a nearly optimal MTD policy. The
algorithm involves solving a bilevel optimization problem in each
iteration, which can be formulated as a mixed integer quadratic
program.
4.1 Assumptions
Before we present our solution, we first make two assumptions.
Assumption 1. The transition probability matrix P can be arbi-
trarily chosen by the defender.
Assumption 2. Given τ > 0 as the lower bound of the defend-
ing period length, the defender’s cost per unit time c(i,u(i))/τi is
continuous and bounded overU (i) for each i .
Both assumptions are reasonable and can be easily satisfied.
Assumption 1 implies an important structure property of the SMDP
as formally defined below.
Definition 4.1 (CommunicatingMDP [24]). For every pair of states
i and j in S , there exists a deterministic stationary policy u under
which j is accessible from i , that is, Pr(sk = j |s0 = i, u) > 0 for some
k ≥ 1.
It is easy to check that the SMDP in our problem is communi-
cating under Assumption 1. It is known that for a communicating
MDP, the optimal average cost is a constant, independent of the ini-
tial state [24]. This property significantly simplifies the algorithm
design and analysis as we discuss below. Assumption 2 is used in
establishing the convergence of the value iteration algorithm under
the continuous action space (see Section 4.3.3).
4.2 Data Transformation
Solving the defender’s optimization problem requires the algorithm
to simultaneously determine the optimal transition probabilities
and the optimal defending periods. The average-cost SMDP problem
with continuous action space is known to be difficult to solve [12].
Fortunately, one can apply the data transformation method intro-
duced by Schweitzer [25] to transform the average-cost SMDP
problem into a discrete-time average Markov decision process (DT-
MDP) problem. The DTMDP has a simpler structure than the SMDP
with the same state space S , and action setsU (i) = [u(i)]n , where
u(i) = (pi ,τi ). The defender’s per-stage cost c(i,u(i)) is converted
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to
c˜(i,u(i)) = c(i,u(i))
τi
(5)
Further, the transition probability from state i to state j for the
DTMDP is
p˜i j (u(i)) = γ
pi j − δi j
τi
+ δi j (6)
where δi j denotes the Kronecker delta (i.e., δii = 1 and δi j = 0 for
all j , i) and γ is a parameter that satisfies 0 < γ < τ ≤ τi1−pii ,
where τ is the lower bound of the defending period length. Let
P˜(u) = [p˜i j (u(i))]n×n denote the transition probability matrix of
the DTMDP and c˜(u) = [c˜(i,u(i))]n the defender’s per-stage cost
across all the states. If the system starts from the initial state s0 ∈ S ,
then the long-term average cost becomes
z˜(s0,u(s0)) = lim sup
N→∞
1
N
N−1∑
k=0
c˜(sk ,u(sk )) (7)
The above data transformation has some nice properties as sum-
marized below.
Theorem 4.2 (Theorems 5.2 and 5.3 of [12]). Suppose an SMDP
is transformed into a DTMDP using the above method. We have
(1) If SMDP is communicating, then DTMDP is also communicat-
ing.
(2) If SMDP is communicating, then a stationary optimal policy
for DTMDP is also optimal for SMDP.
Theorem 4.2 indicates that the transformed DTMDP also has a
contant optimal cost and further, to find a stationary optimal policy
for the SMDP in our problem, it suffices to find a stationary optimal
policy for the transformed DTMDP.
4.3 Value Iteration Algorithm
We adapt the Value Iteration (VI) algorithm [2, 3] to solve the de-
fender’s problem and prove that the algorithm converges to a nearly
optimal MTD policy. Before presenting the algorithm and the theo-
retical analysis, we introduce additional notations.
4.3.1 Additional Notations. LetV be any vector inRn . We define
the mapping F : Rn → Rn as:
F (V ) = min
u
[c˜(u) + P˜(u)V ] (8)
where the minimization is applied to each state i separately. For
any vector x = (x1,x2, . . . ,xn ) ∈ Rn , let L(x) = mini=1, ...,n xi and
H (x) = maxi=1, ...,n xi . Let ∥ · ∥ denotes the span seminorm defined
as follows:
∥x∥ = H (x) − L(x) (9)
It is easy to check that ∥ · ∥ satisfies the triangle inequality, that is,
∥x − y∥ ≤ ∥x∥ + ∥y∥ for any x, y ∈ Rn . Further, ∥x − y∥ = 0 if and
only if there exists a scalar λ such that x − y = λe where e is an
vector of all ones. Thus, there is a vectorV such that ∥F (V )−V ∥ = 0
(V is called a fixed point of F (·)) if and only if there is a scalar λ
such that the following optimality equation is satisfied:
λe +V = min
u
[c˜(u) + P˜(u)V ] (10)
An important result in MDP theory [3, 24] is that the stationary
policy u that attains the minimum in the optimality equation (10)
is optimal and λ gives the optimal long-term average cost.
Algorithm 1 Value Iteration algorithm for the MTD game
Input: S,n, ϵ > 0,τ ,τ ,M,C,R,π ,L, {Al },δ > 0.
Output: P∗,τ ∗
1: V 0 ∈ Rn ;
2: κ0 = 12 , κt =
t
t+1 for t = 1, 2, . . . .
3: repeat
4: t = t + 1;
5: V t = PImp(S,V t−1,τ ,τ ,M,C,R,π ,L, {Al },δ ,κt−1)
6: V = maxi ∈S |V t (i) −V t−1(i)|;
7: V = mini ∈S |V t (i) −V t−1(i)|;
8: until V −V < ϵ
9: P∗,τ ∗ = argPImp(S,V t−1,τ ,τ ,M,C,R,π ,L, {Al },δ )
Algorithm 2 Policy Improvement (PImp)
Input: S,V0,τ ,τ ,M,C,R,π ,L, {Al },δ ,κ
Output: Vt
1: for i ∈ S do
2: v = +∞;
3: for τ = τ ;τ ≤ τ ;τ = τ + δ do
4: Vt (i) = minpi [c˜(i,τ ,M,C,R,π ,L, {Al })
5: +κ
∑
j ∈S p˜i j (pi ,τ )V0(j)]
6: if Vt (i) < v then
7: v = Vt (i);
8: end if
9: end for
10: Vt (i) = v ;
11: end for
4.3.2 The VI Algorithm. The VI algorithm (See Algorithm 1)
maintains a vectorV t ∈ Rn . The algorithm starts with an arbitrary
V 0 (line 1) and a carefully chosen sequence {κt } (line 2) that ensures
every limit point of {V t } is a fixed point of F (V ) (See Section 4.3.3).
In each iteration, V t is updated by solving a policy improvement
step (V t = PImp(S,V t−1,τ ,τ ,M,C,R,π ,L, {Al },δ ,κt−1)) in line
5.
In each policy improvement step (Algorithm 2), instead of finding
the optimal pi and τi together for each state i , which is a challenging
problem, we discretize [τ ,τ ] and search for τi with a step size δ
(line 3). This approximation is reasonable since in practice the unit
time cannot be infinitely small. Note that the smaller δ is, the closer
τ ∗ (line 7) is to the optimal one. Also note that the optimization
problem in line 4-5 is actually a bilevel problem, which will be
discussed in detail in Section 4.4.
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the algorithm 1 stops in a finite
number of iterations (lines 6-8) and is able to find a near-optimal
policy P∗,τ ∗ = argPImp(S,V t−1,τ ,τ ,M,C,R,π ,L, {Al },δ ) (for-
mally proved in Section 4.3.3). In practice, a near-optimal solution
is sufficient because it can be expensive or even unrealistic to ob-
tain the exact minimum average cost in a large-scale MDP. The
algorithm itself, however, still attains the optimal solution if the
number of iterations goes to infinity (and δ approaches 0).
4.3.3 Theoretical Analysis. Our VI algorithm is adapted from
the work due to Bertsekas [3] and Bather [2] that originally ad-
dresses the average cost MDP problem with a finite state space
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and an infinite action space. However, their proofs do not directly
apply to our algorithm because they either consider the transition
probabilities as the only decision variables [2] or involve the use
of randomized controls [3]. In contrast, our strategy includes both
the probability transition matrix and the (deterministic) defending
periods.
For a given stationary policy u with transition matrix P˜ , let P˜∗
denote the Cesaro limit given by P˜∗ = limN→∞{I + P˜ + P˜2 + · · · +
P˜N−1}/N . Then the average cost associated with u can be repre-
sented as P˜∗c˜(u)[24]. The policy u is called ϵ-optimal if P˜∗c˜(u) ≤
λ + ϵe where λ is the optimal cost vector. In practice, it is often
expensive or even unrealistic to compute an exact optimal policy
and an ϵ-optimal policy might be good enough. Our main results
can be summarized as follows.
Theorem 4.3. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, we have
(1) The DTMDP problem (thus the SMDP problem too) has an
optimal stationary policy;
(2) The sequence of policies in Algorithm 1 eventually leads to an
ϵ-optimal policy.
Proof Sketch: The first part can be proved using the similar tech-
niques in the proofs of Theorem 2.4 of [2] and Proposition 5.2 of [3].
The main idea is to show that (1) {∥V t ∥} is bounded thus the vector
sequence {V t } must have a limit point; (2) every limit point of
{V t } is a fixed point of F (·), thus leading to an optimal solution.
The second part follows from Theorem 6.1 and Corollary 6.2 of [2].
The main idea is to show that (1) if ∥F (V t ) − V t ∥ ≤ ϵ , then the
corresponding policy is ϵ-optimal; (2) limt→∞ ∥F (V t ) − V t ∥ = 0
(again using the boundedness of {∥V t ∥}) so that ∥F (V t ) −V t ∥ ≤ ϵ
holds eventually. Note that this condition is exactly the stopping
condition V −V < ϵ in Algorithm 1 (line 8).
The proof of Theorem 4.3 relies on the key property that the
vector sequence {∥V t ∥} generated by Algorithm 1 is bounded. Due
to the coupling of spatial and temporal decisions in our problem,
the techniques in [2, 3] cannot be directly applied to prove this fact.
Below we provide a detailed proof on this result by adapting the
techniques in [2, 3]. We prove that {∥V t ∥} is bounded.
Lemma 4.4. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and {κt } be a nonde-
creasing sequence with κt ∈ [0, 1] for each t . Consider a sequence
{V t } where
V t+1 = F (κtV t ) = min
P,τ
[c˜(P ,τ ) + κt P˜(P ,τ )V t ],
then {∥V t ∥} is bounded.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume V 0 = 0e. Since
c˜(P ,τ ) is bounded according to Assumption 2, there exists a con-
stant β such that 0e ≤ c˜(P ,τ ) ≤ βe. Then using the fact that κt
is nondecreasing, we can shown that {V t } is nondecreasing by
induction. For a communicating system, for each pair of states i
and j, there exists a stationary policy ui j such that j is accessible
from i . Now we combine the transition probability matrices from
these policies to form a new transition probability matrix
Q =
1
n2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
P˜(ui j ) (11)
The key observation is that the matrix Q is also a valid transi-
tion probability matrix, that is, there exists a policy u such that
Q = P˜(u). This is because the defender can choose arbitrary migra-
tion probabilities and the defending period lengths as her strategy.
Formally, for an arbitrary transition probability matrix Q = [qi j ]
given by (11), we may solve the data-transformation equations to
identify the corresponding policy u = (P ,τ ).
qi j =
γpi j
τi
,∀j , i (12)
qii =
γ (pii − 1)
τi
+ 1 (13)
To see this is always possible, we first observe that for any proba-
bility matrix Q = [qi j ] given by (11), we must have qi j ∈ [0,γ/τ ]
for j , i and qii ∈ [1−γ/τ , 1] using the definition of the data trans-
formation. Define a policy u = (P ,τ ) where τ = τe and P = [pi j ] is
given by
pi j =
τqi j
γ
,∀j , i
pii = 1 −
τ
γ
(1 − qii )
Using the above mentioned properties of qi j and the definition of
γ , it is easy to verify that P is a probability transition matrix and
u = (P ,τ ) defined above satisfies equations (12) and (13).
From the definition of Q , every state is accessible from every
other state. Define Ti j as the expected number of transitions to
reach j from i , we have
Ti j = 1 +
∑
k,j
qikTk j , i, j ∈ S, i , j
We can then show by induction that
V t (i) ≤ βTi j +V t (j), i, j ∈ S, i , j, t = 0, 1, . . .
It follows that
∥V t ∥ ≤ max{βTi j |i, j ∈ S, i , j}
Thus, ∥V t ∥ is bounded. This concludes the proof. □
4.4 Bilevel Optimization Problem
To compute the optimal defense strategy with Algorithm 1, we need
to solve the following optimization problem for a given scalar τ
and a vector V t−1 (line 5, 9 in Algorithm 1):
V t (i) = min
pi
[c˜(i, pi ,τ ) + κt−1
∑
j ∈S
p˜i j (pi ,τ )V t−1(j)]
Substitute c˜(i, pi ,τ ) and p˜i j (pi ,τ ) by their definitions in Equations (5)
and (6), and denotewlj,a ≜ E[(τi−ξ la, j )+] andθ j ≜ mi j+γκt−1V t−1(j)
to simplify the notation. The defender’s optimization problem then
simplifies to (with the constant terms in the objective function
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Algorithm 3 Relative Value Iteration algorithm for the MTD game
Input: S,n, ϵ > 0,τ ,τ ,M,C,R,π ,L, {Al },δ > 0.
Output: P∗,τ ∗
1: V 0 ∈ Rn ;
2: W 0 = V 0 −V 0(s)e;
3: κ0 = 12 , κt =
t
t+1 for t = 1, 2, . . . .
4: repeat
5: t = t + 1;
6: V t = PImp(S,W t−1,τ ,τ ,M,C,R,π ,L, {Al },δ ,κt−1)
7: W t = V t −V t (s)e
8: V = maxi ∈S |V t (i) −V t−1(i)|;
9: V = mini ∈S |V t (i) −V t−1(i)|;
10: until V −V < ϵ
11: P∗,τ ∗ = argPImp(S,W t−1,τ ,τ ,M,C,R,π ,L, {Al },δ ,κt−1)
omitted):
min
pi
∑
l
πl
©­«
∑
j
pi jw
l
j,alC
l
al , j
ª®¬ +
∑
j
pi jθ j
s .t . pi j ∈ [0, 1],∀j ∈ S ;
∑
j ∈S
pi j = 1;
al = arg max
a∈Al
©­«
∑
j
pi jw
l
j,aR
l
a, j
ª®¬ ∀l ∈ L.
Using the similar technique for solving Bayesian Stackelberg games [22],
this bilevel optimization problem can be modeled as a Mixed Integer
Quadratic Program (MIQP):
min
pi ,n,v
∑
j ∈S
∑
l ∈L
∑
a∈Al
πlw
l
j,aC
l
a, jpi jn
l
a +
∑
j
pi jθ j
s .t .
∑
j ∈S
pi j = 1∑
a∈Al
nla = 1, ∀l ∈ L
0 ≤ vl −
∑
j
pi jw
l
j,aR
l
a, j ≤ (1 − nla )B, ∀a ∈ Al , l ∈ L (14)
pi j ∈ [0, 1], nla = {0, 1}, vl ∈ R, ∀j ∈ S,a ∈ Al , l ∈ L
where the binary variable nla = 1 if and only if a ∈ Al is the best
action for the type l attacker. This is ensured by constraint (14)
where vl is an upper bound on the attacker’s reward and B is a
large positive number.
4.5 Relative Value Iteration
The VI algorithm can be slow in practice due to the large number
of iterations needed to converge and the complexity of solving
multiple MIQP problems in each iteration. To obtain a more efficient
solution, we introduce a Relative Value Iteration (RVI) algorithm
(see Algorithm 3). The RVI algorithm maintains both a state-value
vectorV t similar to the VI algorithm as well as a relative state-value
vectorW t defined asW t = V t − V t (s)e where s is a fixed state
(line 2). The RVI algorithm again starts with an arbitrary vectorV 0.
In each iteration t , V t andW t are updated as V t = F (W t−1) (line
6) where F is defined in Equation 8 andW t+1 = V t −V t (s)e (lines
7). Under Assumptions 1 and 2, we can show that the sequence
{W t } converges to a vectorW ∗ satisfying the optimality equation
F (W ∗)(s)e+W ∗ = F (W ∗) similar to Equation (10), where F (W ∗)(s)
gives the optimal average cost. Further, Theorem 4.3 still holds by
substituting ∥V t+1 −V t ∥ with ∥W t+1 −W t ∥.
Theoretically, the RVI algorithm does not help improve the effi-
ciency of the VI algorithm sinceW t andV t only differ by a multiple
of the vector of all ones and the bilevel optimization problems in-
volved in both algorithms are mathematically equivalent. In terms
of converge rates, ∥W t+1−W t ∥ has the same bound as ∥V t+1−V t ∥,
as determined by the sequence {κt } (line 2 in Algorithm 1 and line
3 in Algorithm 3) and the upper bound of ∥V t ∥ = ∥W t ∥. In practice,
however, the RVI algorithms often requires smaller number of iter-
ations for the same ϵ . In addition, if we introduce the assumption
that pis ≥ ρ > 0 for all i ∈ S (where ρ can be arbitrarily small) to
further restrict the Markov chain structure and set κt = 1 for all t ,
the rate of convergence can be significantly improved [3] for both
the VI and the RVI algorithms.
5 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
We conducted numerical simulations using the real data from the
National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [21] to demonstrate the
advantages of using MSG for spatial-temporal MTD. In particular,
we derived the key attack/defense parameters from the Common
Vulnerabilities Exposure (CVE) scores [17] in NVD, which has been
widely used to describe the weakness of a system with respect
to certain risk levels. We used data samples in NVD with CVE
scores ranging from January 2013 to August 2016. As in [28], the
Base Scores (BS) and Impact Scores (IS) were used to represent the
attacker’s reward (per unit time) and the defender’s cost (per unit
time) respectively. Further, we used the Exploitability Scores (ES)
to estimate the distribution of attack time.
We conducted two groups of experiments1: the spatial decision
setting and the joint spatial-temporal decision setting. We com-
pared the MSG method with two benchmarks: the Bayesian Stack-
elberg Game (BSG) model [28] and the Uniform Random Strategy
(URS) [28]. We used the Gurobi solver (academic version 8.1.1) for
the MIQP problems in BSG and MSG. All the experiments were run
on the same 24-core 3.0GHz Linux machine with 128GB RAM.
5.1 Spatial Decision
5.1.1 Benchmarks and Settings: In the spatial decision setting,
the defender periodically moves in unit time length and the attacker
instantaneously compromises the system when he chooses the cor-
rect configuration. We compared the MSG model with the original
BSG and URS models in [28]. In BSG, the defender determines the
next configuration according to a fixed transition probability vector
[pj ]n that is independent of the current configuration. In URS, the
defender selects the next configuration uniform randomly.
For fair comparisons, we followed the same data generation
method as used in the work by Sengupta et al. [28]. The system
has four configurations S = {(PHP ,MySQL), (Python,MySQL),
(PHP ,postдreSQL), (Python,postдreSQL)} with the switching cost
shown in Figure 3. The default migration costmatrixM is [[2, 4, 8, 12],
1Code is available at https://github.com/HengerLi/SPT-MTD.
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Figure 3: The migration cost in the MTD system. Each row
represents a source configuration and each column repre-
sents a destination configuration. The updating costs are
shown in the blue boxes.
[4, 2, 11, 7], [8, 11, 2, 12], [12, 7, 12, 2]] (we added an updating cost of
2 to all the switching cost in [28].) We varied the updating cost (see
the numbers in the parentheses of the blue boxes in Figure 3) and
evaluated the impact of different updating cost on the performance
of defender’s strategies.
In this experiment, we considered three attacker types: the Script
Kiddie that could attack Python and PHP , the Database Hacker
that is able to attackMySQL and postдreSQL and the Mainstream
Hacker that could attack all the techniques. The defender possesses
a prior belief of (0.15, 0.35, 0.5) on the three attacker types. The size
each of their attack space is 34, 269 and 48, respectively. For BSG,
the defender’s optimization problem was directly solved with MIQP
as in [28]. For MSG, the bi-level optimization problem was solved
with MIQP for each configuration in every iteration of Algorithm 1
(with the convergence parameter ϵ = 0.1). Since the simulated
migration cost could not be directly compared with the attacking
cost from NVD, we introduced a parameter α to adjust the ratio
between the attacking cost and the migration cost. That is, instead
of themi j shown in Figure 3, we used αmi j as the migration cost
from state i to state j . As α increases, the migration cost has a larger
impact on the defender’s decisions.
5.1.2 Results: We varied the value of α from 0 to 2.5 with an
increment of 0.1 and compared the defender’s cost for the three
policies: the MSG, the BSG, and the URS (See Figure 4). All three
models were restricted to unit length defending period and zero
attacking time. That is τi = 1 for all i ∈ S , and ξ lal , j = 0 for all
al ∈ Al , j ∈ S .
Figure 4 shows that the defender’s cost increases for all the three
policies as the migration cost grows. However, the magnitude of
increase differs in the three policies. In URS, the cost increases
linearly due to the uniform random strategy (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25)
used. In both MSG and BSG, the defender’s cost grows sub-linearly.
However, the defender incurs substantially less cost in MSG. The
reason is that although both MSG and BSG enable the defender to
choose the respective optimal strategies, MSG allows the defender
to vary her strategy according to different source configurations
while in BSG the defender must choose the same strategy for all
the source configurations. When α is small (α ∈ [0, 0.3]), BSG uses
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Figure 4: A comparison of the defender’s cost in the three
policies with spatial decisions only - MSG (ϵ = 0.1), BSG and
URS with unit defending period (τi = 1 for all i ∈ S) and zero
attacking time as the parameter α increases.
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Figure 5: The defender’s cost in the three policies with spa-
tial decisions only - MSG (ϵ = 0.1), BSG and URS under four
different updating cost 0, 2, 4, 6 with α = 1. The four settings
change the default updating cost 2 (in blue boxes of Figure
3) to 0, 2, 4, 6 while keeping the other values unchanged.
(0, 0, 0.5, 0.5) as the defender’s strategy, and MSG chooses almost
the same strategy for each configuration (MSG could do better if we
impose temporal decisions as shown below). When α ∈ [0.4, 1.5],
BSG uses strategies (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25) and (0.25, 0.5, 0, 0.25). In
contrast, as α grows within [0.4, 1.6], MSG chooses the most ben-
eficial configuration (PHP ,postдreSQL) (in term of the attacking
cost plus the updating cost) as the absorbing state. At the turning
point α = 0.6 and α = 1.2, the defender changes the spatial strategy
at (Python,MySQL) from (0, 0, 0.5, 0.5) to (0, 0, 0, 1) and the spatial
strategy at (PHP ,MySQL) from (0, 0, 0.5, 0.5) to (0.5, 0, 0, 0.5) to
trade uncertainty for less migration cost. These source-dependent
adjustments can’t be achieved by BSG. the Markov chain struc-
ture with both the absorbing states (when the system moves in,
it always stays there) and the transient states (once the system
moves out, it never come back) cannot be achieved by BSG since
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the only way to stay in a configuration using BSG is to assign
a probability of 1 to that configuration for all source configura-
tions, which, however, removes any uncertainty to the attacker.
This indicates that MSG can achieve a better trade-off between
the migration cost and the loss from attacks, where the latter is
determined by the uncertainty of the attacker. When α is large, the
overall migration cost is high. In BSG, the defender uses the strategy
(0.5, 0.5, 0, 0) (for α ∈ [1.6, 2.5]) to move between the two config-
urations with relatively low migration cost (which is still higher
than the updating cost). For α ∈ [1.7, 2.5], MSG chooses the strat-
egy (i.e. (0,1,0,0) instead of (0.5,0,0,0.5) at (PHP ,MySQL)) to avoid
the costly move from (PHP ,MySQL) to (Python,postдreSQL) that
has a migration cost of 12, the defender chooses another path by
firstly moving from (PHP ,MySQL) to (Python,MySQL) and then
to (Python,postдreSQL). This again brings some uncertainty to the
attacker.
We further compared the defender’s cost under four different
updating cost settings (see Figure 5). In URS, the defender’s cost
lineally increases as updating cost grows due to the uniform spatial
strategy. In BSG, the defender’s cost stay the same because of the
inaccurate estimation of pipj using the piecewise linear McCormick
envelopes [28]. In contrast, MSG generates the accurate probabili-
ties pi j corresponding to the configuration pair in each migration.
We observe that as the updating cost increases, the gap of defender’s
cost between MSG and other two models decreases. The reason is
that when the divergence between the moving cost and updating
cost is flatted, the advantage of setting the most beneficial configu-
ration as an absorbing state (i.e., avoiding unnecessary switching)
become negligible. MSG has significant advantages over the other
two methods when the migration cost matrix (e.g. the updating
cost is significantly smaller than moving cost) is unbalanced and
the cost values vary from different source configurations.
5.2 Joint Spatial-Temporal Decision
5.2.1 Benchmarks and Settings: In the joint spatial-temporal
decision setting, the defender needs to decide not only the next con-
figuration to move to but also the length of each defending period τ .
In our experiments, τ is in the range of [0.1, 2.6] with an increment
parameter δ = 0.1. For MSG, the optimal τi for each configuration i
was obtained together with the spatial decisions using Algorithm 1.
We extended the BSG and URS policies by incorporating the attack-
ing times and the defending periods into the objectives of both the
defender and the attacker (as we did in our MSG model), where
a fixed defending period is used for all the configurations since
both policies ignore the source configuration in each migration.
To have a fair comparison with MSG, we searched for the optimal
defending period for BSG and URS, respectively, by solving the
following optimization problems:
(1) Uniform Random Strategy (URS) with Temporal Decision:
min
τ
∑
l πl
( ∑
j E[(τ − ξa, j )+]Clal , j
)
+ αn
∑
i, jmi j
nτ
s .t . al = arg max
a∈Al
(∑
j
1
n
E[(τ − ξa, j )+]Rla, j
)
∀l ∈ L
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Figure 6: A comparison of the defender’s cost in the three
spatial-temporal policies - MSG (ϵ = 0.1), BSG and URS as
the parameter α increases. ξa, j ∼ Exp(ESa ).
(2) Bayesian Stackelberg Game (BSG) with Spatial-Temporal
Decisions:
min
p,τ
∑
l πl
( ∑
j pjE[(τ − ξa, j )+]Clal , j
)
+ α
∑
i, j pipjmi j
τ
s .t . al = arg max
a∈Al
(∑
j
pjE[(τ − ξa, j )+]Rla, j
)
∀l ∈ L
We assigned a random attacking time for each attack that aims to
compromise the system. The random attacking time ξa, j was drawn
from the exponential distribution Exp(ESa ) (the mean attacking
time is 1/ESa ) when a is targeting a vulnerability in state j and
ξa, j = +∞ otherwise. Here, ESa refers to the exploitability score
of the vulnerability targeted by attack method a. The ES score of
a vulnerability is a value between 0 and 10 and a higher ES score
means it is easier to exploit the vulnerability [18].
We used the same migration cost setting as the spatial deci-
sion experiment with the default migration cost matrix [[2, 4, 8, 12],
[4, 2, 11, 7], [8, 11, 2, 12], [12, 7, 12, 2]]. For MSG, we set the conver-
gence parameter ϵ as 0.1. For each vulnerability, we generated 1000
samples from the corresponding exponential distribution and used
their average as the attacking time.
5.2.2 Results: When the defender is able to decide when to
migrate, all three models produce lower cost than the respective
models with a fixed unit defending period (See Figure 6 and Fig-
ure 4). When α is small, the attacking cost has a major impact on
the defender’s cost. The shorter defending periods lead to more
frequent switches that can efficiently increases the uncertainty of
the attacker (Figure 7), thus reduce the attacking cost in the end.
As α grows, the migration cost becomes the major factor and the
defender’s spatial decision plays a major role on the cost since
now all models choose the same τ = 2.6 to decrease the unit time
migration cost.
After adding temporal decision, BSG and URS are capable to
adjust the frequency of moving, thus, improve the performance
significantly. Compare with them, the improvement of MSG is not
that obvious since the defender with MSG has already achieved the
Spatial-Temporal Moving Target Defense: A Markov Stackelberg Game Model
                   
 $ O S K D
   
   
   
   
   
   
 '
 H I
 H Q
 G L
 Q J
  3
 H U
 L R
 G 

 V 
 / H
 Q J
 W K
 0 6 *  
 0 6 *  
 0 6 *  
 0 6 *  
 % 6 *
 8 5 6
Figure 7: A comparison of the defender’s temporal decisions
in the three policies when α ∈ [0, 0.4] with a step size of
0.1 and τ ∈ [0, 2.6] with an increment δ = 0.1. For all the
three policies, the optimal defending period of every con-
figuration reaches 2.6 when α ≥ 0.3. MSG-1, MSG-2, MSG-3
and MSG-4 represent the defender’s temporal decisions in
MSG for configurations S = {(PHP ,MySQL), (Python,MySQL),
(PHP ,postдreSQL), and (Python,postдreSQL)}, respectively.
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Figure 8: A comparison of the defender’s cost between MSG
and BSG with different temporal decisions (τ = 0.1, 1, 2.6 and
the optimal τ ). The cost parameter α ∈ [0, 0.2] has an incre-
ment of 0.01. The defender’s optimal spatial decision in BSG
remains unchanged in these settings.
adjustment in some levels by setting some absorbing states (zero
movement).
We observed that for the spatial decisions, the defender in the
MSG model tends to move to configurations with lower attack-
ing cost, namely (PHP ,postдreSQL) and (Python,postдreSQL), and
never move out of them. That is, these two configurations are recur-
rent states and the other two configurations are transient states of
the corresponding Markov chain. When 0.2 < α < 0.9, the defender
tends to move between the two recurrent states to increase the at-
tacker’s uncertainty, while for larger α ≥ 0.9, (Python,postдreSQL)
becomes an absorbing states to reduce the migration cost. In con-
trast, the defender under BSG chooses the strategy (0, 0, 0.5, 0.5)
whenα is small and adopts the uniform strategy (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25)
when α becomes large. The latter is because configurations with
higher average incoming migration cost have lower attacking cost.
Besides, the total cost (the attacking cost plus the average incoming
migration cost) becomes more similar across different configura-
tions when α becomes large. Essentially, MSG has advantages over
BSG in all the scenarios because it allows a more refined trade-
off between migration cost and attacking cost, where the latter is
determined by the attacker’s uncertainty.
For the temporal decisions, MSG, BSG and URS always choose
the maximum τ (i.e., 2.6) when α > 0.3. This temporal strategy
is reasonable when the migration cost weighs more than the at-
tacking cost. In this scenario, increasing τ would decrease the fre-
quency of migration. From Figure 8, we can see that the optimal
temporal decision τ increases as the migration cost weighs more (α
grows). Thus, another reason that MSG outperforms BSG for small
α is because MSG enables the defender to choose a longer period
length on the configurations that have lower attacking cost such as
(PHP ,MySQL) (see Figure 7).
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we consider a defender’s optimal moving target prob-
lem in which both sequences of the system configurations and the
timing of switching are important. We introduce a Markov Stackel-
berg Game framework to model the defender’s spatial and temporal
decision making that aims to minimize the losses caused by compro-
mises of systems and the cost required for migration. We formulate
the defender’s optimization problem as an average-cost SMDP and
transform the SMDP problem into an DTMDP problem that can be
solved efficiently. We propose an optimal and efficient algorithm
to compute the optimal defense policies through relative value it-
eration. Experimental results on real-world data demonstrate that
our algorithm outperforms the state-of-the-art benchmarks for
MTD. Our Markov Stackellberg Game model precisely captures a
defender’s spatial-temporal decision making in face of adaptive and
sophisticated attackers.
Our work opens up new avenues for future research. In our
paper, we have considered the scenario when the defender has
prior information about the distribution of the attacker type. It is
interesting to study the case when the distribution of the attacker
type is unknown to the defender. In our work, we have assumed
that the attacker is myopic. One may consider the MTD problem
when the attacker has bounded rationality [13].
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